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(University of Uppsala)
In his forthcoming examination of G. H. von Wright's tense-logic
[4], Krister Segerberg studies certain infinitary extensions of the
original tense-logic created by von Wright. For one of these ex-
tensions the completeness problem turned out to be harder than
was expected at first sight.1 This paper is devoted to a proof of a
completeness theorem for the extension in question, called Wl
by Segerberg.
We use a countable language of ordinary prepositional logic
supplied with two modal operators: O ("tomorrow") and D ("al-
ways"). The relevant semantics for tense-logic based on this
language uses the frame 9^ = <N, ', < >, where the successor-
relation is the accessibility-relation for O and < for D, i.e.,
the formula O (A) is true at the point n & N iff A is true at n +1,
and the formula D A is true at n € N iff for all k > n A is true at k.
We assume that the reader is familiar with ordinary Kripke-
semantics for modal languages and, in particular, that he under-
stands what it means that "9ft is a model on the frame 9^". We
shall use Ok(A] as a shorthand for
o(oC_.
fe times
1
 Professor Segerberg's original proof idea turned out to be incomplete in that
it used the Lindenbaum lemma, as is usual in canonical model proofs. Because
of the infinitary rules we do not have immediate access to the Lindenbaum
lemma, and I then undertook to prove the lemma using the proof theoretic
machinery hinted at the end of the paper. However, Professor Dag Prawitz
pointed out an embarassing error in my argument for which I am very grateful.
I also want to express my gratitude to Professor Segerberg for much en-
couragement.
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Let Σ be a set of formulae from our language. Σ is said to have a
model on 9^ if there is a model 9JÏ on 9Ϊ such that for some
η EN it holds <3ft t= « A, for every A in Z1.
The main part of Professor Segerberg's paper is spent on a
proof that if a finite Σ is consistent in von Wright's tense logic,
then it has a model on 9Ϊ. Since the rules of von Wright's logic
are finitary, a set is consistent iff all its finite subsets are.
As Segerberg observes, the set θ = {— -Dp} U [on(p] : n€N} is
consistent in von Wright's logic, for every finite subset thereof
has a model on 9^ and is thus consistent. Θ itself, however, has no
model on 9R. In order to improve on this fact Segerberg introduces
an infinitary extension Wl of von Wright's logic. Wl is given by a
Prawitz-type natural deduction system, and we assume some
familiarity with, e.g., [3].
For every n e N:
(j = 1 2)
Λ
ο^νΛ.,) Β Β , 0"(Λ,)
VE(n)
 - - "-
 Vl(n}
 «
o«(ß)
0«(B)
DE(n)1 J
We will prove the following theorem, first stated by Segerberg in
§5 of [4].
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THEOREM. If Σ is consistent in Wl it has a model on 9Ί.
The proof is of the Henkin-type and is modelled on Feferman's
completeness-proof for LO>I£U in [1]. The crux of the proof is the
fundamental
LEMMA. If Σ is a consistent set in Wl, then so is ΣΟ (on+k(A) ->
Ο
η(ΏΑ}}, for some k € N.
Proof. Assume not. Then ΣΌ {on+lc(A} -> On(oA)} is inconsistent
for each k. Hence, for each feeN, Σ \· —>(on+k(A) -> O"(aA)),
hence Σ h On+k(A] Λ ->θ»(ϋΑ), hence Σ \- on+k(A) and
Σ h -Ό«(θΑ), and thus Σ (- o»(DÄ) and Σ \· ->o»(nA), by rule
Dl(n), which contradicts the consistency of Σ.
Let Σ be a consistent set in Wl and <A0, Aif .. .> an enumeration
of our language. We define
Γ = Γ
Λ-fi f\ *·—' .
{A
n
} if this is consistent,
{~~"v4„} otherwise,
U / s-\ m + &Γ13Λ -^  /~\ m Γ ι—ι βΛ \ if1 «i — *^ \ WîT ι—ι D"\\ϋ ^£>J —> Ο ^UjöJi II Α
η
 — ϋ ^LJjöJ,
otherwise.
In step 2η+ 2, k should be chosen as small as possible while
preserving consistency according to the Lemma. We observe
that by construction each Σ
η
 is consistent in Wl. Let Δ — U Σ
η
.
This set Δ has all the properties needed for a canonical model
proof.
(i) For all Α, Α&Δ or —*Α£Δ, but not both. Proof. A = A
n
, for
some n. In step 2n +1 either A or ~vl is added. If both are in A
then they are in some Σ
ηι
 but this contradicts consistency,
(ii) 0»(-Ά) € Δ iff 0»(Χ)<£ Δ. Proof. If O»(-Vi) e Δ and Ο"(Λ) e J
then both are in some Σ
η
, which would then be inconsistent by
two applications of rule ~~Ί(η). If On(A}$A then ~O"(yl)ezl.
Assume On(—>A]$A. Then -O"(—>A)£A. But then some Tfc
would be inconsistent by rule "~"E(n).
4 —Tbeoria 1: 1977
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(iii) 0»(ßAC)ezl iff 0"(B)ed and O»(C)6zJ. Proof. Assume
0»(ß), o»(C) and -O"(ßAC) all belong to Δ. The some Tfc is
inconsistent by rules Λ I(n) and ""'EfO). The converse is similar,
(iv) 0«(AvB)eA iff O«(A)ezl or O»(ß)eJ. Proof. Similar to
(iii).
(v) On(A ~> Β]ΕΔ iff o«(AJeA implies θη(Β)€Δ. Proo/. There
is no difficulty in showing the statement from left to right. As-
sume for other way that the right hand is true but
-Ό»(Λ-»β)€Ζΐ. Two cases: (a) O»(ß)ezl. Then ~O»(A -> ß),
On(B) both belong to some Σ%, which would be inconsistent by
rules -» I(n) and -·Ε(0). (b) O»(ß)£ Δ. Then θη(Α}$Δ and thus
—Ό
η(Α]£Δ. Hence —Όη(Α) and —On(A-»ß) belong to some
27fc. Then 27fc, Ο«(Λ) h O»(ß) by rule -iE(0) and thus Σ* h O»(A -*· ß),
which contradicts the consistency.
(vi) 0»(DA) € Δ iff o»+*(A) e Zl, all k e N. Proof. Left to right is
again easy. For the other way we use that by construction there
is a formula On+k(A} -> On(nA) in Δ. If the right side is true and
the left false, then by using the formula above some Σ
Μ
 would be
inconsistent.
The model is now defined by
90^ t n P iff On(p) e Δ, for prepositional letters p.
Using (i)—(vi) it requires no effort to prove that
l=n Λ iff 0«(A) e 4 for all A.
Hence by putting n = 0 we get the required model on 9Ï, not only
for Σ but also for Δ. Note that the countability of the language is
used essentially in the proof.
It should be remarked here that by dropping V and ~~l from
our language and adding absurdity JL as a primitive with the rules
LA -> -L ]
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then one will get a system that is easily seen to be mutually
interprétable with Wl. For this system one proves without much
effort a normalization theorem along the lines of [3] and [2].
The remarkable ease with which the natural deduction methods
work for Wl, and especially for the modified version hinted at
above, should be credited to the great analogy between Wl and
Peano arithmetic with the omega-rule for which it is well-known
that a smooth proof theory exists.
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